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The Proposed New WIPO Treaty for
Increased Protection for Audiovisual
Performers: Its Provisions and Its
Domestic and International Implications
Adler Bernard*
INTRODUCTION
Creative control over one’s artistic endeavor is an important right
that an artist strives to retain. In addition to creative control, artists
seek to prevent the unlawful distribution of the creative product,
insist on being acknowledged as the creator of the work, and aim to
achieve adequate compensation for the creation. Through union
organization, treaties and national legislation, countries have tried to
ensure that these rights, and others, are protected for those men and
women whose talents have enlightened, challenged, and entertained
us for centuries.
Utilitarian principles adopted in the U.S., and other common law
countries, serve as a basis for affording copyright protection to
writers, musicians and thespians under these legal regimes. These
individuals are granted financial remuneration in return for access to
their products. Through financial encouragement and statutory
protection, artists and society as a whole benefit. In the U.S.,
copyrighted material including books, phonographs and audiovisual
works, and the administrative processes associated with the creative
arts are great sources of wealth both domestically and internationally.
Due to this union of creativity, economics and legislation, the U.S.
remains the premier exporter of entertainment content throughout the
world.1
* The author is a former employee of Sony Music Publishing; J.D. expected 2002, George
Washington University Law School; B.A., New York University, 1997. The author would
like to thank Professor Ralph Oman of George Washington University, Martino & Julie
Bernard, Stan Bernard, Ralph Bernard, and Tara Scott.
1
See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 9 (1998) (noting that the U.S. “exports more copyrighted
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Conversely, in countries such as France, Japan, and in regions such
as Latin America and francophone Africa, an artist’s work product is
viewed as an extension of his or her personality. Ralph Oman,
George Washington University Law School Professor and former
U.S. Register of Copyrights, noted that “[t]he author’s right in his
work is one of the basic Rights of Man the French embraced in their
Revolution of 1789.”2 Preservation of an artist’s “Natural Rights,”
as opposed to his or her rights to economic compensation, is the
primary reason why nations such as France seek to establish
adequate means of protection for the moral or “spiritual” aspects of
an artist’s work product.
Technological developments have given rise to increased modes of
distributing creative content, thus allowing purveyors of art to access
creative works from almost anywhere in the world. For example,
one could view the latest installment at the Whitney Museum in New
York City from the comfort of one’s home in Accra, Ghana. This
increased exposure has expanded the artist’s potential audience and
has created additional sources of revenue.
However, with
technological innovation and increased exposure have come
numerous logistical and legal problems for artists, utilitarian
proponents and the natural rights regime legislators who scramble to
keep the law in step with our rapidly changing society.
Via the International Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations
(hereinafter “ROME”),3 the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act,4 the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(hereinafter “TRIPS”),5 various E.U. Directives6 and most recently
intellectual property than any other country in the world”).
2
See Professor Ralph Oman, The Impact of the Berne Convention on U.S. Copyright
1, 6, Address at the International Intellectual Property Association (Oct. 24, 1996).
3
See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter
ROME].
4
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995).
5
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Dec. 15,
1993, art. 9, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 81, 87 [hereinafter TRIPS].
6
See MARJUT SALOKANNEL, OWNERSHIP OF RIGHTS IN AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTIONS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY Art. 5(1) (1997).
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the World Intellectual Property Organization’s (hereinafter “WIPO”)
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (hereinafter “WPPT”) adopted
in 1996,7 domestic and international copyright negotiators have
attempted to do just that.
With the adoption of the WPPT, musicians, songwriters and audio
performers witnessed the enactment of legislation that granted them
enhanced protection and control over their contributions to sound
recordings, plays, motion pictures and other works that use music.8
Uniform standards concerning the definition of authorship, length of
ownership and control over the distribution, licensing and
duplication of copyrightable content were set forth in this treaty and
adopted by the contracting nations.9
However, one group of artists was conspicuously excluded from
the scope of the WPPT’s protection. The WPPT failed to outline a
method for harmonizing legislation that would ensure protection of
the rights of audiovisual performers in their contributions to
audiovisual fixations.10 Consensus could not be reached on the
manner and scope of protection to be granted to actors.11 These
differences led WIPO members to abandon their hopes of including
audiovisual performers within the WPPT.12
At the close of the 1996 diplomatic conference in Geneva, WIPO
members passed a resolution that called for member states to
reconvene at a later date to negotiate a treaty that would address
audiovisual performers’ rights.13 In the months leading up to the
review of a proposed treaty, U.S. and E.U. representatives were at
odds over how the following issues should be addressed within the
international accord: (1) national treatment; (2) the scope of
7
See World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
Dec. 20, 1996, S. Exec. Doc. 105-17, 18, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT].
8
See id.
9
See id.
10
See ROME, supra note 3; see also Diplomatic Conference Set for December on
Global Pact to Protect Audiovisual Rights, 59 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
868 (2000).
11
See id.
12
See id. at 869.
13
See id.
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protection that should be afforded to performers for the public
broadcast of their works; (3) transfer of rights; and (4) moral rights.14
After much debate, negotiators from over 120 nations met in
December of 2000 at the Diplomatic Conference on the Protection of
Audiovisual Performances. Agreement was reached on nineteen of
the twenty proposed Articles that comprise the treaty. Consensus
could not be reached on an appropriate manner with which
audiovisual performers would transfer their rights to producers so as
to allow producers greater ease in administering and licensing rights
to the audiovisual production.15
This article will examine sixteen of the twenty articles within the
proposed treaty and what impact the treaty would have had on the
manner in which the rights of audiovisual performers are currently
addressed domestically and internationally. First, the article will
examine how audiovisual and phonogram performers are protected
under the WPPT and TRIPS. Next, brief attention shall be paid to
the domestic copyright systems of France, Germany and the United
States. Finally, there will be an analysis of the treaty and a proposal
put forward as to how the nations may want to resolve their
differences concerning transfer of rights from audiovisual performers
to producers.
II. PROTECTION OF AUDIO AND AUDIOVISUAL PERFORMERS:
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
ROME provides minimum standards of protection to musicians,
writers, actors and other creative individuals.16 ROME prohibits the
fixation of a performer’s work without prior consent, and forbids the
reproduction of works that diverge from that to which the performer
had previously consented.17 ROME also prohibits the broadcasting
14

See id.
See Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of an Instrument on the Protection
of Audiovisual Performances to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, World
Intellectual Prop. Org. Diplomatic Conference on the Prot. of Audiovisual Performances, at
22, U.N. Doc. IAVP/DC/3 (Aug. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Proposal].
16
See ROME, supra note 3.
17
See id.
15
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and communication of a performer’s work without prior consent.18
Furthermore, Article 4 of ROME calls for each contracting nation to
grant national treatment to audio and audiovisual performers, and
Article 14 calls for a minimum duration of twenty years of protection
that shall be calculated from the end date of when fixation is first
made.19 Lastly, similar to subsequent treaties and statutes covering
copyrightable material, ROME grants individuals a fair use
exception that is found in Article 15(1).20
ROME’s basic protection covers fixations made by the recording
of audio performances and the filming of audiovisual works. ROME
fails to address issues concerning moral rights, transfer of rights and
the protection of a performer’s contributions to a sound recording.
The importance of each of these unresolved issues grew in the
decades following the enactment of ROME in 1961 due in part to
technological advancement, increased lobbying power of performers
in their respective countries, and shifts in opinions on how the
contracting nations viewed their cultural products. The WPPT and
the Proposed Audiovisual Performances Treaty both set out to go
beyond the basic protocols outlined in ROME.
Under the WPPT, 127 member nations sought to broaden
performers’ rights by: (1) including performers of folklore within the
scope of the treaty; (2) granting audio performers rights with respect
to the communication of their work via the broadcasting of their
recordings; (3) establishing moral rights for performers; and (4)
calling for a fifty-year minimum term of protection.21 The WPPT
proved to be a boon to audio performers because in addition to the
rights above, audio performers were also granted inalienable moral
rights that provided them with the right of attribution in their aural
performances fixed in phonograms.22
The WPPT also addressed emerging formats of distribution of
phonograms, particularly those performances transmitted via the
18
19
20
21
22

See id.
See id.
See id.
See WPPT, supra note 7, at 34.
See id. at 26.
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Internet. Included in the audio performer’s exclusive right to
authorize any communication to the public that incorporates fixed
elements of their work, audio performers were afforded the right to
control the distribution of their works through any form including
on-line/on-demand services.23 Furthermore, the treaty called for the
ratifying nations to adopt a “general right of distribution and a rental
right limited to computer programs, movies and works embodied in
phonograms.”24 Provisions on rights management information and
enforcement procedures that guard against tampering with
technological measures designed to impede any attempted infringing
reproduction, also found their way into the WPPT.25
The WPPT could have easily been seen as a great step towards
harmonizing protection for audio performers and granting these
artists increased economic rights in their performances. However,
many of the 762 representatives of the 127 nations who attended the
Geneva Conference would object to such a conclusion. Similar to
ROME, the WPPT failed to explicitly address the rights of
audiovisual performers in their audiovisual fixations. Many were
disappointed by this omission.26
Richard Arnold, author of
Performer’s Rights, a comparative study of European and U.S. audio
performers’ copyright protection, wrote that “[t]his [omission] was at
the insistence of the U.S.”27 One could only assume that U.S. trade
representatives were somewhat influenced by the political clout
possessed by Hollywood producers who have long opposed setting
universal standards for the protection of audiovisual performers other
than those provided via labor law, the Screen Actors’ Guild
(hereinafter “SAG”) representation, and individual personal service
contracts.28
While performance rights under TRIPS are not as exhaustive as
those mandated by the WPPT, they do require some discussion.
Like the WPPT, TRIPS fails to address the rights of audiovisual
23
24
25
26
27
28

See id.
See id.
See id. at 35.
See RICHARD ARNOLD, PERFORMER’S RIGHTS § 1.94, at 35 (2d ed. 1997).
Id.
Id.
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performers within its scope of protection. TRIPS does grant
phonogram performers certain rights including national treatment,
most favored nations status, and detailed rules concerning minimum
standards of protection for phonogram performances. The agreement
incorporates minimum standards outlined in Articles 1 through 21 of
the Paris Act relating to the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (hereinafter “Berne”), but excludes
Article 6bis’s requirement of moral rights.29 Marshall Leaffer, author
of Understanding Copyright Law, wrote that this omission was due
in large part to the U.S. insistence that it be left out of TRIPS.30 The
U.S. argued persuasively that the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (hereinafter “GATT”)/TRIPS intended to regulate economic
rights, and since moral rights are not economic rights, they had no
place in the negotiation.
Similar to the WPPT, TRIPS grants audio performers the right to
prevent any fixation of their unfixed performances, and
reproductions of their performances without prior consent.31 Also,
audio performers may block broadcasts made by wireless means and
other communications to the public that occur without their prior
consent.32 One other important aspect of TRIPS with respect to
copyright law is that it requires participating nations to provide both
civil and administrative procedures and remedies that copyright
owners can use to enforce their rights.33
Unlike the WPPT, the omission of audiovisual performers
protection in TRIPS was not solely the United States’ doing.
Thomas Murray, author of The U.S. – French Dispute over GATT
Treatment of Audiovisual Products and the Limits of Public Choice
Theory: How an Efficient Market Solution was “Rent-Seeking”,
writes that, “France and the other European Community nations
wanted the audiovisual sector to be excluded from the services
section (General Agreement on Trade in Services) of the General
29
30

1999).
31
32
33

See TRIPS, supra note 5.
See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 12.11, at 398 (3d ed.
See TRIPS, supra note 5.
See id.
See id.
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks; the U.S. wanted the
sector included.34 The American entertainment industry, which
lobbied heavily for inclusion, was seen as the ‘big loser.’”35 The
debate centered around a proposal put forward by France and other
European nations that would have placed a quota on the number of
audiovisual products that they would allow to be imported into their
territories, particularly products emanating from the U.S.36
Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Pictures Association of
America (hereinafter “MPAA”), lobbied on behalf of the U.S. film
industry in opposing any such restriction.37 Mr. Valenti did not have
a difficult time convincing the Clinton Administration that such a
quota would greatly impair not only the film industry, but also would
adversely affect the U.S. economy. Murray noted the following:
The American Entertainment industry is the second largest export
industry in the U.S. after the aerospace and aviation sector,
generating foreign revenues of approximately $18 billion annually
and producing a trade surplus of $4 billion in 1992 alone.
Furthermore, 414,700 workers were directly employed in the
filmindustry and, for every two direct jobs, three were created in
support industries.38
French representatives strictly opposed free audiovisual trade and
pushed for an audiovisual performances protection initiative to be
handled separately from industrial service products. The justification
asserted was their desire to foster and protect local European customs
and moral values.39 Quotas entitled “The Television Without
Frontiers Directive” imposed restrictions on E.U. members that
would require broadcasters to air certain minimum percentages of
audiovisual productions of European origin.40 The U.S. also took
34

Thomas Murray, The U.S. – French Dispute over GATT Treatment of Audiovisual
Products and the Limits of Public Choice Theory: How an Efficient Market Solution was
“Rent-Seeking”, 21 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 205 (1997).
35
Id.
36
See generally id. at 205, 207.
37
See generally id.
38
Id. at 207.
39
Murray, supra note 34, at 207-08.
40
See Council Directive 89/552 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down
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exception to the Europeans’ insistence on continuing subsidies to
member states’ film industries.41
Like the United States’ position during the GATT and WPPT
talks, French trade representatives were greatly influenced by their
film industry lobbyists. Arguments for the preservation of a distinct
European identity within European broadcast content may have been
sincere, but this was only part of the story. German director Wim
Wenders and a host of other European producers, writers, directors
and audiovisual performers were greatly involved in ensuring that
“cultural goods” were left out of the GATT/TRIPS agreement.42
Political pressures and selfish cultural and economic concerns all
contributed to the exclusion of provisions that would have
guaranteed audiovisual performers minimum standards of
international protection that were already afforded to audio
performers. However, E.U. members have taken affirmative steps
towards harmonizing the laws governing audiovisual performers
with those that already safeguard the rights of audio performers. The
first step was to reach a consensus on who is deemed to be the
‘author’ of an audiovisual performance. Member states adopted E.U.
Directive 92/100/EEC, which states that “the principal director of a
cinematographic or audiovisual work shall be [considered] its
author.”43
This same E.U. Directive also endeavors to protect the rights of
audio and audiovisual performers by calling any illegal fixation of a
performer’s live performances an act of piracy.44 The directive
enacts provisions outlining the exclusive licensing and economic
rights of audiovisual performers similar to those adopted in the
WPPT.
Audiovisual performers have the exclusive right to
distribute, authorize or prohibit the broadcasting of their
performances made via wireless means, and other communications to

by Law, Regulation or Administration in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of
Television Activities, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23, cited in Murray, supra note 34, at 208.
41
See id.
42
See id.
43
SALOKANNEL, supra note 6, at Art. 5(1).
44
See id. at Art. 5(2)(1).
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the public.45 Lastly, audiovisual performers have the right to
authorize or prohibit “the rental and lending of the fixations of their
performances.”46
In an effort to allow for an easier means of administering all of the
various rights of the contributors to an audiovisual production, the
French system, like most other domestic copyright systems, sets
forth a method by which all rights are transferred from audiovisual
performers and writers to the producer or director of the work.
French law explicitly states: “Contracts binding the producer and the
authors of an audiovisual work, other than the author of a musical
composition with or without words, shall imply, unless otherwise
stipulated . . . assignment to the producer of the exclusive
exploitation rights in the audiovisual work.”47
With respect to audiovisual performers, French law clearly states
that “the signing of a contract between the performer and a producer
for the making of an audiovisual work shall imply the authorization
to fix, reproduce, and communicate to the public the performance of
the performer.”48 Although the contract between an artist and the
producer is viewed primarily as an employment contract, it has been
given certain legal effect under the country’s artist rights law.49
Marjut Salokannel wrote that “[a]s a counterpart to the automatic
assignment of rights to the producer, the law provides that such
contract shall specify a separate remuneration for each mode of
exploitation of the work.”50
Similar to French law, the German system establishes that the
producer of an audiovisual work holds the right to control the
distribution and fixation of the audiovisual production.51 With the
adoption of the E.U. Directive 92/100/EEC, performers were at least
in theory granted the exclusive right to prohibit the reproduction and
distribution of their audiovisual fixations to the public under German
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

See id.
Id.
Id. at Art. 8(1)(2)(1).
SALOKANNEL, supra note 6, at Art. (8)(1)(2)(2).
See id.
Id.
See id. at Art. 8(1)(1)(1).
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law.52 However, to balance this new directive with the existing
rights granted to producers, audiovisual performers are deemed to
have assigned their rights once they finalize an agreement with the
producer with regard to their participation in the audiovisual
production.53 Furthermore, unlike the French system, performers’
rights in an audiovisual production are usually collectively assigned
to the producer via collective labor agreements.54 Employment law
and artists’ rights law governs the relationship between the two
parties.
The granting of moral rights protection to audio and audiovisual
performers has been hotly contested in France, Germany and
throughout most of the European Union. Most European countries
view protecting an artist’s moral rights as a worthwhile endeavor. At
the same time, these nations understand the importance of taking into
account the nature and scale of an audiovisual production with
respect to moral rights.55 Just imagine a scenario in which a
performer could dictate which scenes could be used in the final
version of a film or the placement of their name in the end credits.
Such authority granted to each major artist in an audiovisual
production could greatly delay, if not derail, the completion of the
project. Due to this concern, European countries have placed great
restrictions on performers’ ability to exercise their rights of integrity
and attribution. In France, performers are prohibited from exercising
their moral rights during the production of a work, and “it is only
after the final version of the film has been approved by a common
accord between the director and producer that moral rights protection
may come into play.”56 At that point in the production, due to the
transfer of rights from the performers to the producer or director via

52
53
54
55
56

See id.
See SALOKANNEL, supra note 6, at Art. 8(1)(1)(2).
See id.
See id. at Art. 2(2)(1).
See id. at Art. 9(2)(1).
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the signing of a contract, only the director or producer may exercise
their moral rights, not the performer.57
Unlike European copyright systems, the American copyright
regime views an audiovisual performer’s contribution to an
audiovisual production as a work made for hire.58 According to §
101 of the 1976 Copyright Act, the employer, or the one who
commissioned the work, is deemed to be the author.59 The executive
producer is more than likely the employer under the U.S. system.
The relationship between audiovisual performers and producers is
governed under labor and employment law.60 Guilds such as SAG
represent performers and negotiate performers’ economic rights and
general employment terms with respect to their participation in any
audiovisual performance.61 Thanks in part to this relationship,
audiovisual performers have managed to reap excellent financial
benefits, albeit sacrificing some protection under copyright law.
Unlike European performers, U.S. audiovisual performers have not
technically been afforded moral rights. Writers, directors and audio
performers also lack a strict statutory regime of moral rights
protection as outlined under Berne. Several states have passed
statutes that recognize a visual artist’s rights of integrity and
paternity in limited circumstances.62 Under the federal scheme,
visual artists are granted the rights of integrity and attribution under
the Visual Artists Rights Act (hereinafter “VARA”).63 But this
limited protection does not cover the works of writers, directors or
audiovisual and audio performers. Many in the U.S., including the
Executive Director of the Writer’s Guild East, view the lack of moral
rights protection within the audiovisual context as being
problematic.64

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

See id.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995).
See id.
See SALOKANNEL, supra note 6, at 334.
See id., § 10.2 at 305.
See LEAFFER, supra note 30, § 8.28(B), at 362.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1996).
See SALOKANNEL, supra note 6, § 10.2.2, at 307.
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III. WIPO TREATY FOR THE PROTECTION OF AUDIOVISUAL
PERFORMANCES
Consensus was reached on all but one of the twenty Articles put
forth in the proposed WIPO Treaty.65 The 120 nations reached
provisional agreement on legislation that would harmonize
international treatment of audiovisual performers’ rights with respect
to distribution, reproduction, national treatment, the audiovisual
performer’s economic rights to unfixed performances and other
entitlements granted to performers in their audiovisual fixations.66
Articles 1 and 2 cover the preamble and provide definitions of key
terms used in the treaty.67 One important provision in Article 2 deals
with the definition of ‘performer’ that was agreed upon by the
contracting nations.68 Before the proposed treaty was presented to
the respective nations, representatives on behalf of the U.S. film
industries had opposed ratifying such a treaty due to the effect it
would have on the administration of rights in audiovisual
productions.69 Donald Wear of Discovery Communications, who
represented North American Broadcasters at the Convention, noted
that as a result of the proposed treaty broadcasters would be subject
to “significantly higher administrative burden[s].”70
In acknowledgment of such a fear, negotiators agreed that the
definition of ‘performers’ would be limited to marquee audiovisual
performers.71 Extras or ancillary audiovisual performers would not
be afforded protection under the proposed treaty. In the eyes of the
contracting states, “‘ancillary participants’ do not qualify for
protection because they do not, in proper sense, perform literary or

65
See USPTO TODAY, November-December 2001, at http://www.uspto.gov
/web/offices/ac/ ahrpa/opa/ptotoday /nov-dec2001.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
66
See Proposal, supra note 15.
67
See id.
68
See id. at 22.
69
WIPO to Debate Rights, TELEVISION DIGEST, Sept. 25, 2000, at
http://www.findArticles.com/cf_0/m3169/39_40/65465363/print.jhtml (last visited Jan. 6,
2002).
70
See id.
71
See Proposal, supra note 15, Art. 2., at 22.
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artistic work.”72 The treaty does grant each contracting nation the
right to draft domestic legislation that would give the “extras” some
protection under domestic audiovisual performances law.73 The
International Federation of Actors (hereinafter “FIA”), an
international lobbying society for audiovisual performers, is in
agreement with this resolution.74 The definition of a performer in the
proposed treaty is similar to that adopted in the WPPT with two
minor additions: (1) “interpretive arts” is added to the list of
protected performances, and (2) an audiovisual performer who
engages in the expression of folklore is covered within the scope of
the treaty.75
Article 3 provides a clear statement of who would be protected
under the proposed treaty. An audiovisual performer must be a
national of one of the contracting nations to be afforded protection.76
If an audiovisual performer is a national of a contracting nation, the
performer will be protected even if he or she is habitually residing in
a non-contracting nation. This language mirrors that which is found
in Article 3(2) of Berne.77
Article 5 deals with the hotly contested debate over the protection
of moral rights.78 The WPPT was the first international instrument to
grant moral rights to performers. Not all contracting nations
incorporated such protection into their domestic laws. In particular,
as mentioned above, the U.S. became a party to both the Berne
Convention in 1989 and the WPPT without explicitly adopting any
federal law extending moral rights to all areas of creativity. The U.S.
did pass VARA, which grants visual artists the rights of attribution

72

Id.
See id.
74
See INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF ACTORS, Comments on the WIPO Basic
Proposal: Prepared for the Diplomatic Conference, December 2000, at 4, at http://www.fiaactors.com/new/wipo_2000_comments_eng.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
75
See Proposal, supra note 15, Art. 2., at 22 (Aug. 1, 2000).
76
See id. at 28.
77
See Paris Act relating to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Jul. 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne].
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and integrity in their works, but audio and audiovisual performers are
not covered within its scope.79
Under Article 5 of the proposed instrument, audiovisual
performers are granted the right to be identified as a performer in an
audiovisual production.80 This clause mirrors that which was
adopted in Article 5 of the WPPT.81 An exception was added to the
treaty that would prohibit audiovisual performers from exercising
their moral rights when, “omission is dictated by the manner of the
use of the performance.”82 This exception is important for it allows
producers to omit a performer’s identity in an effort to preserve the
integrity of a work, and it grants contracting nations some flexibility
in incorporating Article 5 into their domestic law.
Article 5 also states that audiovisual performers would have the
authority to oppose any material distortion of their performances
fixed in an audiovisual medium that would be prejudicial to their
reputation.83 In an effort to decrease the number of possible causes
of action available to a performer under moral rights legislation,
alterations or modifications to a production including standard
editing and abridgment, would not qualify as material distortion.84 In
order for the performer to establish a claim under this clause, an
individual assessment of the way the distortion or change was made
would be necessary.85 Similar to moral rights regulations in France
and Germany, such an assessment would be conducted using a
subjective standard, with close attention paid to the rights of
additional right holders in the production.86 The notes to the
proposed Article clarify this point in stating that any alteration would
not be prejudicial unless it was meaningful or substantial.87

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1996).
See Proposal, supra note 15, at 32.
See WPPT, supra note 7, Art. 5, S. Exec. Doc. 105-17, 18, 36 I.L.M. at 82.
Proposal, supra note 15, at 32.
See id.
See id. at 34.
See id.
See id.
See Proposal, supra note 15, at 36.
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Finally, Article 5 of the proposed treaty puts forth a means by
which an audiovisual performer could waive the moral rights either
by contract or collective labor agreement.88 A performer could agree
to waive the rights to be identified as the performer or to object to
any substantial change to fixations of their audiovisual performances
through an agreement between the parties explicitly waiving moral
rights protection. Such a gesture on the part of the performer would
more than likely be granted in return for financial remuneration.
Moral rights protection is a thorny issue for the FIA. The FIA
wishes to include language from Article 6(1) of Berne that would
cover any derogatory action, even that which is not explicitly listed
in the treaty or currently documented in any national law, in relation
to the performance. 89 The FIA views the granting of moral rights
protection to audiovisual performers as important because “[i]t
would seem a serious shortcoming if the proposed Instrument did not
give a featured actor starring in a cinema film recourse against a
producer who decided to insert a number of pornographic scenes in
the released motion picture attempting to boost box office appeal.”90
Agreement on the scope of Article 5 was difficult for the
negotiators to reach. United States and E.U. representatives
unequivocally disagreed with each other. The U.S. pushed for a
narrow reading of moral rights law that would permit the making of
minor changes to an audiovisual work without requiring approval
from the audiovisual performer.91 Q. Todd Dickinson, the former
Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, stated that “certain
modifications are part of the normal exploitation of the work,
including modifications necessary in reducing the cinema-sized work
to the television-sized work or editing the work to exclude scenes
considered inappropriate for certain audiences.”92 Conversely, E.U.
88

See id. at 36.
See INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF ACTORS, Comments on the WIPO Basic
Proposal: Prepared for the Diplomatic Conference, December 2000, at 4, at http://www.fiaactors.com/new/wipo_2000_comments_eng.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002); see also Berne,
supra note 77.
90
Id.
91
WIPO Members Fail to Agree on Performers’ Rights for Audiovisual Treaty, 61 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 231, 234 (2001).
92
Id.
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negotiators lobbied for strong protection of audiovisual performers’
moral rights that would afford limited exceptions to producers taking
action without audiovisual performers’ prior approval.93
Article 4 addresses the manner with which national treatment
would be granted to audiovisual performers. Under the proposed
treaty, contracting nations are required to afford equivalent
protection and entitlements to nationals of other countries to those
they grant to their own citizens with respect to the exclusive rights
outlined in the treaty.94 But the treaty does allow each nation to limit
the degree of uniform national protection with respect to each of the
exclusive and economic rights set forth in the treaty.95 The language
dealing with ‘rights’ and ‘exclusive rights’ in Article 4 is intended to
encompass moral rights protection as well. A similar interpretation
was used in finding that moral rights protection is included under the
umbrella of national treatment in Article 4 of the WPPT.96
The U.S. and the E.U. disagreed on the appropriate scope of this
Article. The U.S. wanted an expanded definition of national
treatment that would subsume all audiovisual-related rights.97 On the
other hand, the E.U. lobbied for a narrow definition of this Article.98
European Union representatives felt that only rights explicitly
outlined in the proposed treaty should be given national treatment.
Nonetheless, the two sides managed to work out their differences by
mutually endorsing the above-referenced language as part of Article
4 of the treaty.
The economic rights granted to performers under the proposed
treaty would augment compensation schemes for audiovisual
performers currently in place in various domestic laws. Article 6
grants performers limited economic rights in their unfixed
performances. This right simply allows performers to possess the

93
94
95
96
97
98

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Proposal, supra note 15; see also WPPT, supra note 7, Art. 4.
See Proposal, supra note 15, Art. 2, at 22.
See id.
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exclusive right to control communications to the public, and the right
to regulate the fixation of their live performances.99
Audiovisual performers are given the right to control direct and
indirect reproductions of their audiovisual fixations via the proposed
treaty.100 According to the notes to Article 7, language concerning
‘direct and indirect reproductions’ is used to highlight the fact that
the location of the reproduction of an original fixation will have no
significance on the performer’s right to control reproduction of the
audiovisual fixation.101 This provision is an exact replica of Article 7
of the WPPT.102
Surprisingly, Article 7 fails to carve out a fair use exception to the
audiovisual performer’s exclusive distribution right. Article 9(2) of
Berne does provide some language for the granting of exceptions to
the reproduction right.103 But Berne leaves the crafting of an
appropriate standard up to each contracting nation. Under U.S. law,
the “fair use doctrine” has been used to defend against claims of
copyright infringement, as long as the one asserting fair use complies
with the four factors set out in 17 U.S.C. § 107.104 European
countries such as the United Kingdom and France adopted fair
dealing provisions into the E.C. Rental and Lending Directive.105
Similar to the U.S. exception, an E.C. fair dealing defense to what
would be an infringing reproduction applies to all copyrightable
works.106 Whether the contracting parties would include such an
exception in implementing the audiovisual performers treaty remains
to be seen.
Article 8 of the proposed instrument grants audiovisual performers
the exclusive authority to control the distribution of performances
99

See id. at 38.
Id. at 40.
101
Id. at 41.
102
See Proposal, supra note 15, at 40; see also WPPT, supra note 7, Art. 7.
103
See Berne, supra note 77, Art. 9(2).
104
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1995).
105
See Council Directive 92/100 on Rental and Lending Right and on Certain Rights
Related to Copyrights in the Field of Intellectual Property, 1992 O.J. (L 346/61), cited in
ARNOLD, supra note 26, § 5.04, at 122.
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See id.
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that incorporate their audiovisual fixations.107 This provision would
only apply to the first sale of original copies of the fixed audiovisual
performance. After the first sale, each country would be allowed to
devise additional rules governing audiovisual performers’ rights to
equitable remuneration for subsequent transfers.108
Article 9 concerns the audiovisual performers’ exclusive right to
authorize the rental and lending of original copies of their
fixations.109 Although quite prevalent in the E.U., and adopted into
the WPPT, a performer’s right to control the rental and lending of his
or her fixations has not made its way into U.S. law.110
Understanding this dynamic, treaty negotiators designed an
exception to this exclusive right that would allow each contracting
nation the authority to waive compliance with this provision if it is
deemed that, “commercial rental has [not] led to widespread copying
of fixed performances that materially impairs the right of
reproduction.”111 This exception was more than likely put forward
by U.S. negotiators. Such an assumption is valid due to the fact that
U.S. movie studios receive large amounts of annual income from the
rental of audiovisual productions. Furthermore, a similar exception
was drafted into Article 11 of TRIPS.112 It is uncertain whether E.U.
nations would be required to grant national treatment with respect to
Article 9 as it applies to U.S. audiovisual works due to this conflict
in protection.113
Similar to Article 6’s recognition of the role digital
communications play in the distribution of copyrightable material,
Article 10 grants performers the exclusive right to make their fixed
performances available by any means, including wire or wireless
channels.114 This Article expands the scope of protection available
to an audiovisual performer under Articles 8 and 11, as it deals with
making a work available through interactive or on-demand
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

See Proposal, supra note 15, at 42.
See id.
Id. at 44.
See WPPT, supra note 7, Art. 9.
Proposal, supra note 15, at 44.
See id.; see also TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 14.
See LEAFFER, supra note 30, § 12.12, at 541.
See Proposal, supra note 15, at 46.
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technology.115 Furthermore, viewers or customers who receive an
audiovisual production via this mode of distribution are not allowed
to make the work further available to the public or distribute it
without the consent of the performer.116 This proposed Article is just
a baseline standard, as contracting parties are free to enact more
stringent legislation under their domestic law.
Under Article 11, contracting parties agreed to provide audiovisual
performers with the exclusive right to authorize and control any
broadcasting and communications to the public that incorporate their
audiovisual productions.117 The treaty defines communication to the
public to include fixed and unfixed performances transmitted by any
medium.118 This definition is important for two reasons. First, the
treaty grants audiovisual performers rights over the dissemination of
their performances whether or not they are first fixed. Additionally,
by providing language that covers transmissions via any medium, the
treaty allows performers to regulate on-line communications of their
audiovisual performances. The only exception to the above right
would be for re-broadcasting. A similar exception is carved out in
Article 6 of the WPPT.119
The language concerning the treaty’s treatment of the audiovisual
performers’ authority over broadcasts to the public was much tamer
than what was initially proposed. Broadcasters lobbied for a
“watered-down provisional text.”120 Broadcasters were able to
secure an exception that allows each contracting nation to inform
WIPO that a right of equitable compensation would be provided to
audiovisual performers in lieu of an exclusive right.121 Under
paragraph 2 of Article 11, contracting nations have the ability to
establish a right of remuneration system that would include the
establishment of an agency designed to clear the aforementioned use
of the audiovisual content, and collect revenue generated from this
115

See id.
See id.
117
See id. at 48.
118
See id. at 25.
119
See WPPT, supra note 7, at 27.
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WIPO Members Fail to Agree on Performers’ Rights for Audiovisual Treaty, supra
note 91, at 233.
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activity.122 Such an exception greatly diminishes the administrative
burdens placed on broadcasters, and manages to secure the
audiovisual performers’ claim to compensation for the transmittal of
their performances.
This model for compliance with Article 11 mirrors the scheme
now in place in the U.S. with regard to phonograms, musical works
and the performance rights attached to these copyrightable creations.
Musical works are performed extensively over the radio, and in clubs
and restaurants. Because of this fact, individual copyright holders
would have a difficult time enforcing their performance right.
Performance rights societies such as the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (hereinafter “ASCAP”), and
Broadcast Music, Inc. (hereinafter “BMI”) provide a means by which
musical composers and publishers license and enforce their valuable
performance right.123 ASCAP and BMI also collect income earned
from such licenses, and distribute royalties to the musical
composers.124
An audiovisual rights society could similarly be established to
administer the broadcast and communication rights of audiovisual
performers. Many nations possess an audio-performances rights
society that carries out duties similar to either ASCAP or BMI.125 In
the U.S., SAG represents audiovisual performers collectively. One
of SAG’s duties is securing the economic rights of audiovisual
performers in an audiovisual production.126 SAG, or another entity
like it, would have little difficulty carrying out the collection of
royalties stemming from an audiovisual performer’s broadcast and
communication rights.

122

See id.
See LEAFFER, supra note 30, § 8.22, at 348; see also ASCAP, About ASCAP, at
http://www.ascap.com/lp_about_ascap.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2002); BMI, BMI
Backgrounder, at http://www.bmi.com/about/backgrounder.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
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See id.
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Bennett M. Lincoff, Worldwide Music Performance Rights: The Devil in the Details,
at http://musicomm.net/rcrclincoffdevil.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
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See SAG (Screen Actors Guild), Membership Services Frequently Asked Questions,
at http://www.sag.org/faq/membership_services_faq.html#1 (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
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Before engaging in a discussion of Article 12’s treatment of
transfer of rights, it is worth mentioning provisions in Articles 14, 15
and 16 concerning the term of protection, and each contracting
nation’s technological measurements and rights management
information obligations. Article 14 sets out a fifty-year term of
protection measured from the year fixation is first made.127 This
standard is in compliance with both WPPT and TRIPS.128
Article 15 deals with obligations concerning technological
measures to which each contracting nation must adhere.129 Under
this Article, each contracting nation is obligated to establish baseline
legal protection and effective legal remedies against unauthorized
circumvention of technological measures. The notes corresponding
to Article 15 define this standard as “national level provisions that
provide genuine support for the rights provided for in the proposed
Instrument.”130 While the Article does not outline what remedies are
necessary to meet compliance, it does characterize those remedies
that possess strong deterrent features, and sufficient sanctions against
forbidden acts as being in full compliance with the treaty.131 One
could assume from the enactment of this provision that negotiators
understood the importance of each nation establishing effective laws
and preventative measures, and the positive effect global compliance
would have on consumers and businesses that desire to engage in
electronic commerce.
Article 16’s Obligations concerning Rights Management
Information requires each nation to provide legal remedies to any
audiovisual performer who discovers a person knowingly engaging
in any of the prohibited acts listed in paragraph 1(i).132 Prohibited
acts include the removal of any electronic rights management
information without the consent of the audiovisual performer;
distributing and broadcasting or communicating to the public,
without the consent of the audiovisual performer, any audiovisual
127
128
129
130
131
132

See Proposal, supra note 15, at 60.
See WPPT, supra note 7; see also TRIPS, supra note 5, at 305.
See Proposal, supra note 15, at 62.
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See id.
See id. at 64.

FRMT4BERNARD

2002]

5/17/02 3:10 PM

WIPO’S PROPOSED AUDIOVISUAL PROTECTIONS

1111

performance with knowledge that the rights management information
has been deleted or tampered with.133 Establishing electronic rights
management information is completely voluntary. Only when such
information has been attached to the audiovisual work would a
contracting nation be required to comply with enforcement of this
right.
IV. TRANSFER OF RIGHTS: NORTH ATLANTIC TUG-OF-WAR
All of the above proposed Articles gained consensus at the
December 2000 Geneva Conference.134 Despite all the hard work,
the convening nations could not come to terms on how audiovisual
performers would transfer their rights to producers who contracted
the services of the audiovisual performer. Transfer of rights deals
with the means by which audiovisual performers, and other owners
of copyrightable content incorporated in a audiovisual production,
transfer their rights to the producer of the work. Such a system
allows audiovisual producers or directors to control the bundle of
copyrightable works within their audiovisual production, thus
allowing for an easier means of administering and licensing the
production.
Battle lines over transfers of rights were drawn well before the 120
nations convened in Geneva. Both E.U. and U.S. negotiators knew
that their individual approaches were quite different from one
another, and that ultimately one side would have to acquiesce for
ratification.135 Such a concession never came to pass.
Four alternative Article 12 proposals were put forth at the
meetings. The first, Alternative E, would have established a
rebuttable presumption of the transfer of an audiovisual performer’s
exclusive rights under the proposed treaty to the producer of the
production.136 As soon as the audiovisual performer consented to the
133
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See Proposal, supra note 15, at 17.
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supra note 91, at 234.
136
See id. at 54.
134

FRMT4BERNARD

1112

5/17/02 3:10 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.12:

incorporation of his or her performance in the production, the
audiovisual performer would have triggered the transfer of the
audiovisual performance rights. Alternative F would have provided
a “presumed entitlement to exercise the rights.”137 This presumption
would apply so long as there was not a written agreement between
the producer and the audiovisual performer to the contrary.138 Both
Alternatives E and F would have been mandatory upon the
contracting nations.139
The FIA is unilaterally opposed to Alternative E. The Federation
believes that if this version of Article 12 were adopted, the
instrument would change from being one designed to protect
performers, to a treaty granting increased protection to producers.140
Furthermore, the FIA appropriately notes that adopting this
Alternative would force many jurisdictions to reduce the level of
protection currently afforded to audiovisual performers.141
The third proposed scheme for the transfer of rights was
Alternative G, which served to bridge the two competing legal
systems. This alternative would allow each country to establish its
own standards for transfer of rights with the laws of the country that
is most closely connected to the audiovisual production governing
the legal arrangement between producer and performer.142 The last
suggested model was Alternative H, which would provide each
nation the ability to decide whether or not they would enact
legislation governing transfer of rights.143 Furthermore, if enacted,
each contracting party would be allowed to determine the nature and
scope of rights transfer legislation with no intervention from
WIPO.144
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On their face, both Alternatives G and H would seem to be illadvised if the convening nations truly endeavored to strike an
international treaty aimed at harmonization and certainty. Each of
these two alternatives would preserve the status quo. The notes to
the proposed Article best sum up this predicament: “Alternative G
gives some certainty as to what national law will apply but does not
harmonize national laws. Alternative H would perpetuate the current
situation.”145
Differences between E.U. and U.S. negotiators stemmed from each
group’s desire to incorporate language found in their respective legal
systems. The E.U. set out to protect E.U. law in this area by making
the transfer of rights from the audiovisual performer to producer
contingent upon the performer’s express consent.146 The E.U. is
unconditionally opposed to an automatic transfer of rights regime.147
It is quite logical for one to be persuaded by the proposals put forth
by the E.U. member states. E.U. countries have for years endeavored
to harmonize the protection afforded to audiovisual performers with
that already granted to audio performers.148 E.U. community law has
managed to grant protection to audiovisual performers while at the
same time allowing producers to acquire rights in the audiovisual
production via an administratively friendly contractual consent
system.149
Conversely, the motion picture and television industries of the
U.S. offer audiovisual performers unparalleled financial
remuneration for their contributions to a work.150 Under the current
U.S. system, performers have extensive contracts with motion
145
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See WIPO Members Fail to Agree on Performers’ Rights for Audiovisual Treaty,
supra note 91, at 232.
147
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61 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 112 (2000).
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picture studios through collective bargaining agreements with
SAG.151 Organizations such as SAG allow both producers and
performers the opportunity to go about their jobs without the
unnecessary grief of negotiating agreements covering each
performer’s exclusive rights, and whether or not they had been
cleared before shooting the production. In an effort to bring such a
model to the international level, the U.S. trade representatives fought
for the recognition of their system, which ensures an automatic
transfer of rights to the producer.152 United States officials argued
that this proposed system is “essential in order to allow producers to
show their works abroad without running into a thicket of legal and
bureaucratic hurdles.”153 One U.S. official characterized the U.S.
approach as a more laissez-faire method of doing business, while the
E.U. system endeavors to regulate economic relationships.154
The disagreement between the U.S. and E.U. negotiators centered
on two words: ‘entitlement’ versus ‘agreement.’ The E.U. wanted
the following language included in Article 12:
[A]n agreement to exercise such rights based on the
consent of the performer to the fixation shall be governed
by the law of the country chosen by the parties, or to the
extent that the law applicable to the agreement between
the performer and the producer has not been chosen, by
the law of the country with which the agreement is most
closely connected.155
The aforementioned language reads as if there was a merger of
Alternative F with Alternative G. The U.S. was in agreement with
the majority of the language cited above, except that U.S. negotiators
wanted “an entitlement to exercise” to replace “an agreement to
exercise.” The reason for the United States’ opposition to the
phrasing of the E.U. proposal was that U.S. negotiators wanted the
151

See id.
See WIPO Members Fail to Agree on Performers’ Rights for Audiovisual Treaty,
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treaty to reflect the current U.S. practice of creating work made for
hire arrangements that allow for the automatic transfer of rights from
performer to producer.156 Furthermore, U.S. negotiators believed
that parties who agree to such arrangements should be allowed to
decide what national law governs their relationship.157 One U.S.
negotiator felt that entitlement was “absolutely needed . . . in the text
in order to ensure a balanced agreement which establishes
performers’ rights while also establishing certainty and clarity in the
ability of producers to show their films internationally.”158
European Union negotiators took exception to the U.S. approach.
In their opinion, the U.S. was attempting to protect the rights of
producers, not audiovisual performers, and trying to “inject private
law into an international treaty and in effect impose its legal
practices on other countries.”159 European Union officials felt that
such a policy could lead to confusion for producers, legislators and
courts who could be faced with the following hypothetical situation:
Usually when a work is produced in Italy using Italian actors, Italian
law would govern the relationships between the parties. However,
under the U.S. transfer of rights policy, an Italian judge could be
bound to apply U.S. law to settle any dispute if the parties had
contractually agreed to such an arrangement.160
CONCLUSION
The potential benefits of an audiovisual performances treaty are
numerous. Producers, audiovisual performers and broadcasters on
both sides of the Atlantic would benefit from a uniform set of laws
that would provide audiovisual performers increased financial
rewards and creative control, while affording producers, consumers

156
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and others a clearer understanding of what they can and cannot do
with audiovisual fixations.161
Although the agreement would more than likely increase the price
of movie tickets worldwide, it would grant rights to audiovisual
performers in territories where such entitlements are nonexistent.
Jorgen Blomqvist, WIPO Copyright Division Director, noted that
“[i]f you are an actor, in many countries you have no rights
whatsoever.”162 Artists such as Hong Kong cinema star Maggie
Cheung would be given the opportunity to take action against
individuals who pirate her work in Venezuela.163 Furthermore, an
audiovisual performer would have the ability to control the
accessibility of their audiovisual performances via digital means and
the authority to bring an action against individuals who digitally
distribute the audiovisual performer’s fixation without the
performer’s consent.164 Ms. Cheung commented on this dilemma by
stating:
On a more personal level, I am very concerned about the Internet
because when I look up ‘Maggie Cheung’ on the Internet I see about
25 sites on my work, or photos of me, even clips from my films
which I didn’t even know about and nobody even asked me if I
would allow this to be put onto a site.165
Audiovisual performers have lobbied in support of a treaty that
would transform how legislators perceive their participation in the
motion picture and television industries.166 The FIA believes that it
is important to have the economic rights of audiovisual performers
governed under intellectual property rights law as opposed to labor
161
See WIPO MAGAZINE, Substantial Progress on Pact for Performers’ Rights (Feb.
2001), available at http://www.wipo.org/publications/general/121/2001/févriere.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2001).
162
See Alexander Higgins, Action Call on Actors’ Rights: Actors are being Ripped Off
by Broadcasts of Their Work Overseas and on the Internet, Says the UN, Which is Moving
to Give Them Greater Protection, TOWNSVILLE BULLETIN, Dec. 9, 2000, at 29.
163
See Actors Urge Anti-Piracy Protection in Internet Age (Dec. 12, 2000), at
http://terra.com/movies/articulo/html/mov1808.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
164
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law. Katherine Sand, General Secretary of the FIA, noted the
difficulty performers have with their employers under a labor law
regime. Ms. Sand stated that “U.S. performers had to strike for
residual payments and are constantly under pressure from
producers. . . . [T]hey have as precarious an existence as anyone else
in the world.”167
In an effort to strike an accord at the next conference on the
proposed Audiovisual Performances Treaty, E.U. and U.S. legislators
may want to reevaluate their respective positions on Article 12. Both
parties agree on the overall language found in the proposed Article,
and earnestly desire to ratify the treaty. Although some may view
the E.U. approach as being pro-audiovisual performer, more so than
the United States’ proposal, much can be said for the financial
rewards and critical acclaim U.S. audiovisual performers have earned
over the years. The SAG strike of 2000 displayed the power of the
audiovisual performer’s labor force.168 The cohesive strength of U.S.
entertainment unions were put on display again during the summer of
2001 as the Writers Guild of America pushed for increased
attribution rights for their contributions to audiovisual productions.
Ms. Sand’s assessment of the plight of audiovisual performers may
have been technically accurate, but she failed to address the benefits
that have and will continue to come to U.S. audiovisual performers
due to the SAG strike, their negotiating power and their easy access
to the public airwaves.
Probably the best approach to resolving the dispute concerning the
language of Article 12 would be to allow each nation the opportunity
to choose either of the two models for rights transfer. A similar
resolution was made in allowing the U.S., and other nations, the
opportunity to become part of the WPPT without requiring these
nations to adopt domestic moral rights legislation. Although such an
approach would not foster true international harmonization, it would
pave the way for the ratification of a treaty that guarantees
167

Id. at 233.
For details on the strike of 2000, see Chris Neumer, SAG: Strike One, at
http://centerstage.net/stumped/articles/sag.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2002); Screen Actors
Guild, at http://www.sag.org (last visited Jan. 6, 2002).
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audiovisual performers baseline protection in regions of the world
where they currently lack such entitlements.
Whether or not such an accord can be reached at the next WIPO
conference on audiovisual performers’ rights is uncertain. At the
time of this writing, E.U. and U.S. negotiators had not conceded to
such an approach, but remained optimistic that an agreement would
be forthcoming. Due to rapid globalization and increased piracy of
entertainment content, negotiators may be pressed by their respective
audiovisual performers’ rights societies and guilds, into quickly
striking a resolution. Such a step would certainly be welcomed by
negotiators and audiovisual performers alike.

